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Abstract
COVID-19 has highlighted the responsibilities of states under the International Health Regulations 
(IHR), as well as state accountability in case of a breach. These approaches and dimensions are valuable, 
as many COVID responses have breached human rights. We should also look beyond this crisis and 
address country preparedness for effective and equitable responses to future infectious disease outbreaks. 
This paper assesses countries’ international legal obligation law to be prepared to respond to this and 
future public health emergencies. It does so from the perspective of the right to health, in interaction 
with the IHR. We analyze the functional relationship between the right to health and the IHR, focusing 
in particular on “core obligations” under the right to health and “core capacities” under the IHR. We find 
considerable parallels between the two regimes and argue in favor of more cross-fertilization between 
them. This regime interaction may enrich both frameworks from a normative perspective while also 
enhancing accountability and public health and human rights outcomes. 
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Introduction
COVID-19 has put a spotlight on the responsi-
bilities of states under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) and on state accountability in 
case of a breach.1 In addition, there has been much 
debate about how measures to protect against 
COVID-19 infringe on the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights, in particular the rights to privacy 
and freedom of movement. 2 It is important to 
evaluate these matters carefully given the current 
crisis. While these approaches and dimensions are 
valuable, we should also look beyond this crisis and 
address country preparedness to respond to future 
infectious disease outbreaks. 
To this end, this paper assesses countries’ 
international legal obligation to be prepared to 
respond to this and future public health emergen-
cies. It does so from the perspective of the right to 
health as a fundamental economic and social right, 
in interaction with the IHR. This contribution is 
grounded in the understanding that COVID-19 
reflects, in essence, a crisis of the right to health: be-
cause countries do not deliver the right to health in 
its own right or as reflected by the IHR, many other 
problems, including violations of international law, 
arise. We contend that better integration of human 
rights into the IHR will not simply boost social 
justice and health equity in IHR-related pandemic 
responses but could also boost the public health ef-
ficacy of such measures.3 We analyze the functional 
relationship between the right to health and the 
IHR, focusing in particular on core obligations un-
der the right to health and core capacities under the 
IHR. We consider the overlaps between these two 
international law regimes insofar as they prescribe 
prioritized state duties within both regimes, and the 
extent to which their respective duties may assist 
in defining or implementing each other. We argue 
that this kind of systemic integration is supported 
within international law’s accepted rules for treaty 
interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which provides that “international 
standards may be interpreted in the light of any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.”4 We argue further 
that doing so helps resolve the problem of fragmen-
tation within international law, as demonstrated by 
interpretations of the IHR that are not compliant 
with human rights. It also helps advance a more 
human rights-consistent implementation of the 
IHR. Legal analysis of this nature offers important 
guidance to states implementing the IHR during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as for future 
disease outbreaks. It is also relevant to potential 
reforms of the IHR that seek to boost adherence to 
human rights during pandemic outbreaks.5 
Historical emergence of the right to health 
and the IHR 
The right to health
To understand the interaction between the right to 
health and the IHR, one must go back to the period 
right after World War II. It was a period of opti-
mism and belief in a better and healthier world, a 
time where the idea was voiced that “medicine is 
one of the pillars of peace.”6 In 1946, states adopted 
the Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), the founding document that led to 
WHO’s establishment in 1948. It is a remarkable 
and groundbreaking document in many ways. The 
preamble to the WHO Constitution defines health 
as a “state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being, and not merely the absence of disease.” 
This definition has often been criticized for being 
too absolute, yet it should be seen in the light of 
postwar idealism and can be appreciated for its ref-
erence to mental and social well-being as important 
dimensions of health.7
The preamble was also pioneering for its rec-
ognition of health as a right: “the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of race, religion, political belief, eco-
nomic or social condition.” This wording informed 
the right to health provisions in the United Nations 
(UN) human rights treaties that were adopted 
in the decades thereafter. The most authoritative 
provision is arguably article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which stipulates the “right to the highest 
attainable standard of health.” Other key provi-
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sions include article 12 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women; article 24 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child; and article 25 of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Since the 
beginning of this century, article 12 of the ICESCR 
and article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child have begun to be complemented with 
“general comments,” explanatory documents that 
carry the status of soft law but are nonetheless seen 
as authoritative.8 
These treaties are widely ratified—171 coun-
tries have ratified the ICESCR, 182 countries have 
ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 189 countries have ratified the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, and 196 countries 
have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 9 Thus, in contrast to the universality of 
ratifications of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, approximately 25 of 196 states globally have 
not ratified the ICESCR and are not legally bound 
by this treaty’s right to health. On the one hand, 
this shortfall underscores that our analysis is rele-
vant for the majority of states. On the other, the fact 
that nonratifying states include the United States 
points to the larger political challenge of advancing 
a right to health lens for the IHR given the United 
States’ long-standing objections to the legal status 
of economic, social, and cultural rights in general 
and the right to health in particular.
As indicated above, WHO was the first in-
ternational organization to recognize health as a 
human right. However, over the past 73 years of its 
existence, WHO has not manifested itself as a hu-
man rights organization. Yet the organization has 
gradually embraced the human rights framework 
owing to the way that it has been developed by UN 
human rights mechanisms. 
The International Health Regulations
The WHO Constitution grants considerable legis-
lative powers to the World Health Assembly. Based 
on articles 19–23 of the Constitution, the assembly 
may adopt conventions, (binding) regulations, and 
(nonbinding) recommendations. The results have 
been very disappointing so far: since its establish-
ment in 1948, WHO has adopted only one treaty 
(the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control) 
and two regulations (the Nomenclature Regula-
tions and the IHR). While the results are scant, 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
and the IHR are highly authoritative instruments. 
Central to this paper is the IHR.
International collaboration in the field of in-
fectious disease control started in the second half 
of the 19th century. In 1851, the first international 
sanitary conference took place. Many similar meet-
ings followed, and subsequent sets of international 
sanitary regulations were gradually adopted. The 
IHR, adopted in 2005 and entered into force 2007, 
is the most recent set of regulations. Given its status 
as regulations, the IHR is binding on all 194 WHO 
member states without their consent (although 
members may notify the director-general of rejec-
tion or reservations). 
The new IHR is innovative because of its “all 
hazards” approach: it covers risks arising from 
numerous sources, not just a limited list of diseas-
es.10 Thus, even a terrorist attack with anthrax or 
a chemical spill could fall within the remit of this 
instrument if it is established that the threat con-
stitutes a “public health emergency of international 
concern.”11 Such emergencies have been declared 
six times since the IHR’s adoption: influenza in 
Mexico (2009); Ebola in West Africa (2014); polio in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria (2014); Zika in 
South America (2016); Ebola in Congo (2018); and 
COVID-19 in China (2020).
The IHR refers to human rights in various 
provisions (articles 3, 23, 32, and 45). Article 3, which 
outlines general principles of the regulations, states 
that the IHR shall be implemented with “full respect 
for the dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of persons” and “guided by the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Constitution of the 
WHO.”12 Despite this reference to the WHO Con-
stitution, these references are, in essence, linked to 
respect for civil and political rights, including the 
rights to privacy, physical integrity, and freedom of 
movement (for example, medical consent in article 
23 and respect for travelers in article 32). Contrary 
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to the WHO Constitution and the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, the IHR does not 
mention the right to health.11 This is an important 
omission, given that—as we will demonstrate be-
low—states’ obligation to prepare and respond to 
infectious disease outbreaks is an essential compo-
nent of the right to health. This overlap is apparent 
in the stated goal of the IHR—“universal applica-
tion for the protection of all people of the world 
from the international spread of disease”—which 
is functionally similar to the ICESCR’s duty to 
prevent, treat, and control epidemic, endemic, and 
other diseases, even though the former has a more 
explicitly universal focus than the largely domesti-
cally oriented duties of the ICESCR.13 
Another important shortcoming of the IHR is 
its lack of sanctions: states refusing to collaborate 
with WHO in case of an outbreak can go without 
any warning or punishment. As we argue below, the 
UN human rights monitoring system and domestic 
courts may offer complementary mechanisms for 
holding states accountable under the IHR.
Comparing and contrasting core 
obligations and core capacities: Connecting 
the dots
Our main point is that the core obligations under 
the right to health are closely intertwined with the 
core capacities under the IHR. Starting with the 
UN human rights framework, we will now briefly 
discuss both regimes and discuss their interaction 
with each other.
The right to health’s prioritized obligations: 
Essential elements and core and comparable 
priority obligations
Article 12 of the ICESCR stipulates that states 
should take steps necessary for “the prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, oc-
cupational and other diseases.” Hence, there is a 
clear human rights obligation on the part of states 
to take measures to combat epidemic diseases. An 
explanation of the meaning and scope of the right 
to health is provided in General Comment 14, is-
sued by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Although this instrument is not 
legally binding, it is seen as highly authoritative. 
Three components of this general comment are im-
portant for infectious disease control because they 
identify and define essential, core, and otherwise 
prioritized aspects of this right:
AAAQ. According to General Comment 14, 
the right to health contains a set of interrelated and 
essential elements, which are considered to provide 
guidance to the actions by states: availability, ac-
cessibility, acceptability, and quality. This so-called 
AAAQ is an authoritative set of standards that is 
increasingly applied across international and do-
mestic health settings. While it certainly lacks 
precision, it helps identify weak spots in health 
decision-making. Given that these (and similar) 
principles are applied frequently in health settings 
and because their importance is underscored by 
governments and health authorities, we suggest 
that this framework is emerging as a norm of cus-
tomary international (health) law. 
The AAAQ is also very informative in the con-
text of COVID-19, as it pinpoints the weak spots in 
states’ responses to this crisis. First, key problems 
stem from a lack of availability of health personnel, 
intensive care beds, drugs, masks, and gloves. Second, 
many problems occur in the context of accessibility—
for example, inequalities in access to health care by 
vulnerable persons (such as older persons, persons 
with low socioeconomic status, and persons with 
underlying health conditions) and a lack of geograph-
ically accessible, affordable, and good-quality health 
care. Third, in terms of acceptability, COVID-19 cre-
ates many health care settings where medical ethics 
are under threat, such as care homes where older and 
disabled persons are denied contact with the outside 
world. Lastly, in terms of quality, due to a scarcity 
of properly trained personnel and suitable medical 
equipment, many people are deprived from accessing 
good-quality health care. Again, while this frame-
work lacks precision and may not be used to identify 
concrete human rights violations, it helps frame the 
analysis and debate about how the right to health is 
guaranteed in the context of COVID-19, and it shows 
the extent to which countries are prepared to address 
future crises.
b. toebes, l. forman, and g. bartolini / general papers, #-#
   D E C E M B E R  2 0 2 0    V O L U M E  2 2    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal 5
Core obligations. The second concept in the 
right to health framework that is of key importance 
to infectious disease control is the recognition 
of “core obligations” under the right to health. 
General Comment 14 refers to General Comment 
3, which notes that states have “a core obligation 
to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights 
enunciated in the Covenant, including essential 
primary health care.” For the identification of the 
specific core obligations under the right to health, 
General Comment 14 makes reference to the Pro-
gramme of Action of the International Conference 
on Population and Development (1994) and WHO’s 
Alma-Ata Declaration (1978), stating that these pro-
grams provide “compelling guidance” on the core 
obligations arising from article 12.14 The committee 
identifies a set of core obligations, four of which are 
particularly relevant to the COVID-19 crisis: (1) en-
sure nondiscriminatory access to health facilities, 
goods, and services on a nondiscriminatory basis, 
especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups; 
(2) provide essential drugs as defined by WHO; (3) 
ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, 
goods, and services; and (4) adopt and implement 
a national public health strategy and plan of action 
addressing population health concerns. General 
Comment 14 reinforces the importance of core 
obligations, indicating that they are non-derogable 
and that states cannot justify noncompliance under 
any circumstances.
The meaning of the concept of core obligations 
has been discussed extensively in human rights 
discourse, and interpretations regarding its scope 
and force differ.15 For example, there are debates 
about the omission of essential health care as a core 
obligation, and confusion as to whether the core 
obligations of the right to health are non-derogable 
or whether resource scarcity may be an excuse for 
governments not to fulfill these obligations.16 In 
addition, there has been controversy over the legit-
imacy of this concept in toto, as well as discussion 
about whether the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights was justified in importing 
into the ICESCR a set of obligations without ob-
vious textual basis in the covenant itself.17 In its 
subsequent general comments, the committee has 
moved away from its controversial articulation 
of core obligations as non-derogable, focusing 
instead on whether implementation is reasonable 
or proportionate.18 This shift is potentially reflec-
tive of the committee’s response to wide-standing 
criticisms of the unfeasibility of a non-derogable 
standard for core obligations, particularly for 
low- and middle-income countries.19 It also reflects 
the committee’s broader adoption of a contextual 
“reasonableness” analysis as a standard for adjudi-
cating violations of economic, social, and cultural 
rights under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 
adopted in 2013.20 The committee’s defined criteria 
for assessing reasonableness include whether states 
have taken deliberate, concrete, and targeted steps 
to fulfill rights; have acted in a nondiscriminatory 
manner; and have taken into account the precar-
ious situation of disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups and prioritized grave situ-
ations or situations of risk.21 Core obligations are 
cited explicitly insofar as they are affected by retro-
gressive resource constraints.22 This interpretation 
implies that the committee sees the minimum core 
acting as a bar to regression, and an important con-
sideration in assessing the legitimacy of resource 
constraints.23 The suggestion is that states hold core 
obligations under the right to health as specified in 
General Comment 14, with a duty to take reason-
able steps toward fulfilling them.
Thus, the idea of a core content—and the 
notion that there is a basic subsistence line below 
which no government should fall—is informative 
in a crisis setting, where resources are limited and 
there are surging needs for urgent health care. 
Comparable priority obligations. Core obligations 
are buttressed by obligations of comparable priori-
ty, which also hold validity in relation to COVID-19. 
These duties include providing immunization 
against major infectious diseases occurring in the 
community; taking measures to prevent, treat, and 
control epidemic and endemic diseases; providing 
education and access to information concerning 
the main health problems in the community; and 
providing appropriate training for health person-
b. toebes, l. forman, and g. bartolini / general papers, #-#
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nel, including education on health and human 
rights.24 
In essence, all the principles and obligations 
set out in Table 1 are related to states’ duty to build 
resilient health systems. 
Core capacities under the IHR
Alongside the core content of the right to health 
outlined above, the IHR include a series of obliga-
tions related to structural and capacity-building 
measures that are expected to contribute to the 
overall goal “to prevent, protect against, control 
and provide a public health response to the in-
ternational spread of disease.”25 Articles 5 and 13 
require states to develop within fixed deadlines the 
capacities to detect, assess, notify, and report pub-
lic health risks and public health emergencies and 
respond promptly and effectively to such events. 
Core capacities to be implemented at the local, in-
termediate, and national level are detailed in annex 
1 of the IHR and further specified in subsequent 
technical documents.26 Currently, according to 
the IHR monitoring process, states are requested 
to self-assess the implementation of 13 core capaci-
ties spelled out in 24 indicators related to different 
issues, including health infrastructure, legal and 
financial frameworks, staff, decision-making, and 
information capacities (Table 2).27
The parallels and overlaps between the core 
right to health obligations under the ICESCR and 
the core capacities under the IHR are striking. For 
instance, as set out in Table 1, the right to health 
framework requires states to “adopt a national pub-
lic health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of 
epidemiological evidence.” This element has several 
commonalities in the IHR, where, for example, core 
capacity 1 addresses the need to have “an adequate 
legal framework in all relevant sectors to support 
and facilitate the effective and efficient implemen-
tation of all of their obligations and rights under 
the IHR”; core capacity 8 “focuses on the overall 
national health emergency framework and system 
for enabling countries to be prepared and oper-
ationally ready for response to any public health 
event, including emergencies, as per the require-
ment of IHR”; and indicator C9.3 refers to “access 
Right to health principles relevant to 
infectious disease control (General Comment 
14, para. 12)
Right to health core obligations relevant to 
infectious disease control (General Comment 
14, para. 43)
Right to health comparable priority 
obligations relevant to infectious disease 
control (General Comment 14, para. 44)








• Ensure the right of access to health facilities, 
goods, and services on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, especially for vulnerable and 
marginalized groups
• Provide essential drugs as defined under 
the WHO Action Programme on Essential 
Drugs and Vaccines
• Ensure equitable distribution of all health 
facilities, goods, and services 
• Adopt and implement a national public 
health strategy and plan of action, on 
the basis of epidemiological evidence, 
addressing the health concerns of the 
whole population; the strategy and plan of 
action shall be devised, and periodically 
reviewed, on the basis of a participatory 
and transparent process; they shall include 
methods (such as right to health indicators 
and benchmarks) by which progress can be 
closely monitored; the process by which the 
strategy and plan of action are devised, as 
well as their content, shall give particular 
attention to vulnerable and marginalized 
groups
• Provide immunization against major 
infectious diseases occurring in the 
community
 
• Take measures to prevent, treat, and control 
epidemic and endemic diseases
 
• Provide education and access to information 
concerning the main health problems in the 
community
 
• Provide appropriate training for health 
personnel, including education on health 
and human rights
Table 1. Right to health obligations under the ICESCR
b. toebes, l. forman, and g. bartolini / general papers, #-#
   D E C E M B E R  2 0 2 0    V O L U M E  2 2    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal 7
to essential health services” aimed to guarantee 
“resilient national health systems.”28 Core capacities 
provided by the IHR, as further detailed in WHO 
practice, might thus give more substance to the less 
detailed wording under the right to health through 
the identification of minimum requirements pro-
vided by the IHR, regardless of the structural and 
economic differences among states.
However, while core capacities are a corner-
stone of the IHR system, evidence suggests that 
their implementation and monitoring remain a 
challenge. Even if states were required to comply 
with them by 2016, based on self-assessments pro-
vided by states in 2018, about two-thirds of states 
Table 2. Core capacities under the IHR
Core capacity 1: Legislation and financing
Indicator C.1.1: Legislation, laws, regulations, policies, administrative requirements, or other government instruments to 
implement the IHR 
Indicator C1.2: Financing for the implementation of IHR capacities
Indicator C1.3: Financing mechanism and funds for timely response to public health emergencies 
Core capacity 2: IHR coordination and national IHR focal point functions 
Indicator C2.1 National IHR focal point functions under IHR 
Indicator C2.2 Multisectoral IHR coordination mechanisms 
Core capacity 3. Zoonotic events and the human-animal interface 
Indicator C3.1. Collaborative effort on activities to address zoonoses 
Core capacity 4: Food safety
Indicator C4.1 Multisectoral collaboration mechanism for food safety events 
Core capacity 5: Laboratory
Indicator C5.1. Specimen referral and transport system 
Indicator C5.2 Implementation of a laboratory biosafety and biosecurity regime 
Indicator C5.3 Access to laboratory testing capacity for priority diseases 
Core capacity 6: Surveillance
Indicator C6.1 Early warning function: indicator- and event-based surveillance 
Indicator C6.2 Mechanism for event management (verification, risk assessment, analysis investigation) 
Core capacity 7: Human resources
Indicator C7.1 Human resources for the implementation of IHR capacities
Core capacity 8: National health emergency framework
Indicator C8.1 Planning for emergency preparedness and response mechanism
Indicator C8.2 Management of health emergency response operations 
Indicator C8.3 Emergency resource mobilization 
Core capacity 9: Health service provision
Indicator C9.1 Case management capacity for IHR-relevant hazards 
Indicator C9.2 Capacity for infection prevention and control and chemical and radiation decontamination 
Indicator C9.3: Access to essential health services 
Core capacity 10: Risk communication
Indicator C10.1 Capacity for emergency risk communications 
Core capacity 11: Points of entry
Indicator C11.1 Core capacity requirements at all times for designated airports, ports, and ground crossings 
Indicator C11.2 Effective public health response at points of entry 
Core capacity 12: Chemical events
Indicator C12.1 Resources for detection and alert 
Core capacity 13: Radiation emergencies
Indicator C13.1 Capacity and resources
Source: World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005): State party self-assessment annual reporting tool (Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2018)
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have poor or modest levels of preparedness, with 
overall scores ranging from 1 to 3 out of 5. 29 Accord-
ing to Lawrence Gostin and Rebecca Katz, many 
countries lack the financial resources to meet the 
core capacities, while high-income countries have 
offered little financial support; further, Amitabh 
Suthar et al. suggest that there is limited knowledge 
on how countries should achieve the core capacities 
domestically.30 
In addition, the IHR is not accompanied by 
an effective monitoring system able to push states 
toward the implementation of core capacities: 
mandatory annual reports to be provided by states 
on their implementation are not subjected to any 
review mechanism or follow-up, as is common 
in other areas of international law. Only in 2016, 
based on the recommendation “to move from ex-
clusive self-evaluation to approaches that combine 
self-evaluation, peer review and voluntary external 
evaluations,” did WHO’s director-general launch 
some new technical tools aimed at supporting states 
in the implementation of core capacities.31 These in-
struments, reflected in the current IHR Monitoring 
and Evaluation Framework, include guidance on 
simulation exercises and after-action reviews, as 
well as a joint external evaluation tool aimed at in-
dependently assessing states’ capacities to prevent, 
detect, and respond to public health risks. This lat-
ter tool has resulted in the preparation of detailed 
reports reviewing the strengths and weaknesses 
of countries under scrutiny. Thus far, around 110 
countries have been evaluated through this pro-
cess: however, no follow-up on reports is expected, 
and the above-mentioned tools are voluntary 
ones.32 While these processes are worthwhile and 
may strengthen the implementation of the IHR, a 
series of additional concerns are still present. For 
instance, states that have failed to implement the 
core capacities are no longer required to develop 
national implementation plans as originally re-
quired under articles 5 and 13 . Additionally, the 
dispute settlement mechanism provided by article 
56 of the IHR might be qualified as a weak one: in-
deed, the review committee established in relation 
to the H1N1 pandemic underlined how “the lack of 
enforceable sanctions” was “the most important 
structural shortcoming of the IHR.”33
Toward an integrated interpretation of the 
right to health and the IHR 
As Table 3 illustrates, there are considerable 
parallels between states’ obligations to have core ca-
pacities under the IHR and their “minimum core” 
and other obligations under the right to health. We 
argue in favor of more cross-fertilization between 
these two regimes. This regime interaction may en-
rich both frameworks from a normative perspective 
while also enhancing accountability, social justice, 
and public health outcomes. 
Normative interaction may arise through a 
systemic interpretation of the IHR, whereby, ac-
cording to article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, “international standards 
may be interpreted in the light of any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties.” The right to health clearly can 
be considered a relevant rule of international law 
that can assist in the interpretation of the IHR, par-
ticularly insofar as it underscores the importance 
of IHR duties from a human rights perspective. 
Table 3 offers a non-exhaustive illustration of 
obvious overlaps and synergies between right to 
health duties and IHR core capacities. For example, 
implementing the core obligation to ensure nondis-
criminatory access to health care facilities, goods, 
and services would require explicit legal protection 
against discriminatory applications of pandem-
ic-response legislation, such as emergency orders 
and lock-downs (core capacity C.1). It would also 
require explicit protection against discrimination 
in access to testing (core capacity C.5), surveillance 
(core capacity C.6), emergency resource mobiliza-
tion (core capacity C.8), access to essential health 
services (core capacity C.9), and public health 
responses at points of entry, such as airports and 
border crossings (core capacity C.11). 
The pressing need for strong human rights 
protections in these areas has been reinforced by 
the discriminatory applications of COVID-19 laws 
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Table 3. Comparison of IHR core capacities and ICESCR right to health obligations
Core capacities (IHR) Core right to health obligations (ICESCR) Other aspects of the right to health (ICESCR)
Core capacity 1: Legislation and financing
• Indicator C.1.1 Legislation, laws, 
regulations, policies, administrative 
requirements, or other government 
instruments to implement the IHR 
• Indicator C1.2 Financing for the 
implementation of the HR capacities
• Indicator C1.3 Financing mechanism and 
funds for timely response to public health 
emergencies
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Duty to implement legislation
Duty to progressively realize the right to 
health within maximum available resources 
Duty to take measures to prevent, treat, and 
control epidemic and endemic disease 
Core capacity 2: IHR coordination and 
national IHR focal point functions
• Indicator C2.1 National IHR focal point 
functions under IHR 




Duty to provide access to information 
concerning the main health problems in the 
community, including methods of preventing 
and controlling them
Core capacity 3: Zoonotic events and the 
human-animal interface 
• Indicator C3.1 Collaborative effort on 
activities to address zoonoses
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
 
Core capacity 4: Food safety
• Indicator C4.1 Multisectoral collaboration 
mechanism for food safety events 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
Core capacity 5: Laboratory
• Indicator C5.1 Specimen referral and 
transport system 
• Indicator C5.2 Implementation of a 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity regime 
• Indicator C5.3 Access to laboratory testing 
capacity for priority diseases
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Realization of the AAAQ 
Core capacity 6: Surveillance
• Indicator C6.1 Early warning function: 
indicator- and event-based surveillance 
• Indicator C6.2 Mechanism for event 
management (verification, risk assessment, 
analysis investigation) 
 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
 
Core capacity 7: Human resources
• Indicator C7.1 Human resources for the 
implementation of IHR capacities 
 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
Duty to provide appropriate training for 
health personnel
Realization of the AAAQ
Sources: World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005): State party self-assessment annual reporting tool (Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2018); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000)
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and policies in all of these core IHR domains, in-
cluding disproportionate force in the enforcement 
of COVID-19 emergency orders against racial and 
ethnic minorities and the poor; unaffordable and 
unavailable testing and health care services; dis-
criminatory enforcement of border restrictions; 
and failures to adequately consider nondiscrimi-
nation on the basis of disability or race in policies 
to address essential critical care during COVID-19 
surges.34 The core obligation to ensure the equitable 
distribution of health care facilities, goods, and 
services holds similar cross-cutting relevance for 
many of these same parts of the IHR, including 
legislative frameworks and financing mechanisms 
(core capacity C.1), access to laboratory testing 
(core capacity C.5), human resources for implemen-
tation of IHR capacities (core capacity C.7), and 
emergency resource mobilization (core capacity 
C.8). Taking serious account of core right to health 
duties in the implementation of such IHR capac-
ities would significantly enhance the fairness and 
efficacy of pandemic responses, with concrete ben-
efits for public trust, social justice, and population 
health.35 
At the same time, the comprehensive IHR 
framework gives more detail to the open-ended 
wording under the right to health framework and 
provides considerable clarification of states’ duty 
to prevent, treat, and control epidemic disease. For 
example, the core capacity requirement regarding 
Core capacities (IHR) Core right to health obligations (ICESCR) Other aspects of the right to health (ICESCR)
Core capacity 8: National health emergency 
framework
• Indicator C8.1 Planning for emergency 
preparedness and response mechanism
• Indicator C8.2 Management of health 
emergency response operations 
• Indicator C8.3 Emergency resource 
mobilization 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease 
Realization of the AAAQ
Core capacity 9: Health service provision
• Indicator C9.1 Case management capacity 
for IHR-relevant hazards 
• Indicator C9.2 Capacity for infection 
prevention and control and chemical and 
radiation decontamination 
• Indicator C9.3 Access to essential health 
services 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to provide essential medicines
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
Duty to provide appropriate training for 
health personnel
Realization of the AAAQ
Core capacity 10: Risk communication
• Indicator C10.1 Capacity for emergency risk 
communications 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
Duty to provide access to information 
concerning the main health problems in the 
community
Core capacity 11: Points of entry
• Indicator C11.1 Core capacity requirements 
at all times for designated airports, ports, 
and ground crossings 
• Indicator C11.2 Effective public health 
response at points of entry 
 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
Duty to ensure nondiscriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services
Duty to ensure equitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods, and services
Duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic 
and endemic disease
Core capacity 12: Chemical events
• Indicator C12.1 Resources for detection 
and alert 
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
and plan of action to address population’s 
health concerns
 
Core capacity 13: Radiation emergencies
• Indicator C13.1 Capacity and resources
Duty to adopt national public health strategy 
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access to essential health services during a disease 
outbreak (C.9) fills a key gap in core obligations 
under the right to health, which do not speak ex-
plicitly to this imperative.
Subsequently, recognition that the IHR core 
capacities might inform the content of the human 
right to health suggests that if states fail to comply 
with the IHR, they may be held accountable under 
the UN human rights regime (for example, the 
reporting procedures and individual complaint 
mechanisms of the CESCR, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, CEDAW, and Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as 
the UN Special Procedures). They may also be held 
accountable in domestic courts, as illustrated by 
successful human rights-based challenges to dis-
proportionately forceful and restrictive COVID-19 
lockdowns in Kenya and Malawi.36 
More generally, there is an urgent need to 
perceive public health emergencies as a matter 
of international human rights obligations and 
accountability. The right to health means that 
governments should evaluate their prepared-
ness for the next global public health emergency, 
whether it comes from within their own borders or 
from abroad. Governments should do so in close 
consultation with WHO, the most authoritative 
organization globally when it comes to infectious 
disease outbreaks, which has generated a wealth 
of expertise over the course of its existence. Giv-
en that WHO is unable to sanction, the ultimate 
consequence when states fail to comply with their 
obligations should be accountability under the 
UN human rights regime, in addition to domestic 
litigation.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic underscores the impor-
tance of more effective and more equitable disease 
control initiatives within and across borders. It also 
illustrates the challenges posed by the fragmented 
areas of international law relating to health and dis-
ease control. We suggest that the right to health offers 
principles and binding duties capable of achieving 
some extent of the systemic integration called for in 
2006 by the International Law Commission.37 This 
idea finds support in international human rights 
law scholarship, with suggestions that the right 
to health could act as “a core, unifying standard” 
and “pillar” in international law related to health.38 
As this paper indicates, taking the right to health 
seriously in the IHR could concretely improve the 
fairness and efficacy of the IHR and associated 
pandemic responses in ways that the COVID-19 
pandemic has underscored are critically required.39 
At the same time, the greater specificity of IHR du-
ties gives more detail to the open-ended wording of 
the right to health, including by clarifying the state 
duty to prevent, treat, and control epidemic disease 
and suggesting that access to essential health ser-
vices should appropriately be construed as a core 
obligation under the right to health. In particular, 
we hope that this analysis supports greater regime 
interactions in which human rights law is more se-
riously taken into account in the potential redesign 
of the IHR and in which responses to COVID-19 
and future disease threats more concretely consider 
the right to health. This proposal is not simply legal-
istic: this time of significant upheaval underscores 
the imperative for pandemic responses to be rooted 
in socially just, humane, and cooperative domestic 
and global state actions. We believe that advancing 
a more integrated interpretation of the IHR and the 
right to health offers practical and policy-relevant 
pathways to achieve this outcome. This paper offers 
a preliminary sketch of some conceptual and insti-
tutional overlaps between these two regimes. The 
imperative for global health and human rights re-
searchers is to advance this research to ensure that 
both the IHR and international human rights law 
are further developed to achieve these goals. 
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